The generation born in the 1990s — the so-called “post-90s” cohort — arrived as China’s boom years rolled on. They are better educated and more digitally connected than their parents, yet many face stagnant wages, skyrocketing housing costs, unstable jobs, and an economic backdrop that is less forgiving than the one their elders enjoyed. Put bluntly: being born in the 1990s in China is increasingly an exercise in expectation management. This article parses why many post-90s feel poorer than previous generations, how structural economy and culture collide to create that feeling, and why near-term prospects may be tougher still.
Below I trace the main forces — labor market shifts, the property crisis and housing affordability, intergenerational dynamics, the politics of work and status, and the macroeconomic drag of debt and slowdown — and finish with what policymakers, families, and young people can do to blunt the impact.
Who are the “post-90s” and why they matter
“Post-90s” (90后) commonly refers to Chinese citizens born between 1990 and 1999. They are the first generation in modern China who largely grew up online, entered university in the 2010s in large numbers, and are now entering their peak working-age years. They matter because their economic choices — whether to marry, buy a home, have children, or migrate across regions — will shape demographics, consumption, and social stability in the decades ahead. A generation’s financial health is therefore both a private issue (individual wellbeing) and a public one (housing markets, fertility, and domestic demand).
The paradox sets the stage: higher education and digital fluency have not translated into the secure middle-class life many anticipated.
The labor market shock: education growth meets precarious demand
1. More graduates, fewer secure jobs
China massively expanded higher education in the 2000s and 2010s. The payoff — sheer numbers of graduates — began to show strain when demand for entry-level white-collar positions didn’t keep pace. In 2020 and after, a record surge in university graduates competed for a stagnating number of desirable positions. That imbalance pressured starting salaries and gave employers bargaining power. The result: higher underemployment and a large cohort of educated workers in precarious, project-based, or low-paid service roles. This mismatch contributes directly to the sense of being “overeducated but underpaid.”
2. Youth unemployment is real and rising
Official and independent indicators show elevated youth joblessness in recent years. Urban unemployment for China’s 16–24 age group has spiked into double digits at times, reflecting structural demand problems and cyclical weakness. High youth unemployment weakens bargaining power, delays household formation, and increases financial dependence on parents — all worsening the “feeling poor” despite education gains. (Reuters)
3. The gig economy and nonstandard work
Like other countries, China’s digital platforms created fast jobs (delivery couriers, platform customer service, short-term creators) but not always stable careers. Gig and platform work can offer flexibility and income opportunities, but these jobs often lack benefits (pensions, steady contracts, mortgage-friendly proof of income) that help households climb into asset ownership. For a generation looking to buy apartments and start families, insecurity matters more than headline employment numbers.
Housing: how the asset economy locked young people out
1. Homeownership is the central economic gate
In China, homeownership is not just shelter — it’s social capital, retirement security, and a prerequisite for marriage in many communities. The decades-long boom in property values turned housing into the dominant pathway to middle-class status. Younger cohorts who enter the job market during elevated price levels face a much steeper climb to ownership than their parents did.
2. The property crash made things worse, not better
The 2021 property shock — Evergrande and related liquidity problems — revealed the fragility behind fast price appreciation. That crisis stalled construction, froze many buyers’ deposits in unfinished projects, and reduced home equity for owners. A shaky market erodes the asset ladder that younger people hoped to climb and saps consumer confidence. The human fallout — delayed keys, stalled projects, and shaken trust — has been widely reported and contributes to the financial and psychological insecurity of younger households. (Financial Times, Reuters)
3. Affordability, credit, and parental dependence
High prices plus tighter credit conditions pushed many young buyers to rely on parental help, co-signers, or delayed purchases (renting instead). That dependence transfers wealth inequality across generations: parents who bought earlier benefit from capital gains and can subsidize their children, while young adults without wealthy parents face permanent disadvantage. The result is increased inequality and a sense among many post-90s that hard work alone won’t buy the conventional life script.
The macro backdrop: slowdown, debt, and a less forgiving economy
China’s rapid growth years masked growing imbalances — local government reliance on land sales, developer leverage, and rising debt. Since late 2010s, growth has slowed and policy has oscillated between stimulus and deleveraging. The consequences are real: weaker demand for services, slower hiring, and fewer high-paying new roles for ambitious young professionals.
Observers have warned that China’s debt and property issues could produce prolonged economic stagnation similar to other historical slowdowns, making job creation and asset appreciation less reliable going forward. That macro uncertainty aggravates the micro-level problems post-90s face: even meritorious career moves are less likely to produce rapid upward mobility when the economy cools. (TIME)
Culture, expectations, and the “asset society” problem
1. Rising expectations collide with asset dominance
Post-90s were raised during a period of rising material standards and greater consumer choice. They internalized expectations of homeownership, travel, and visible status markers. But when social mobility depends more on owning assets (especially housing) than on income mobility alone, meritocracy yields to luck and initial endowments. That mismatch — wanting the life script but lacking the asset base — fuels frustration and fuels movements that reject the rat race.
2. “Lying flat,” burnout, and symbolic resistance
A visible cultural response has been the “lying flat” (躺平) movement: a deliberate stepping back from careerism and consumption. For some it’s a protest against wage stagnation and intense workplace cultures (e.g., long hours and “996” expectations). For others it’s a survival strategy — lower consumption, delayed marriage, and less pressure to chase an unattainable asset benchmark. The movement is part cultural critique, part coping mechanism for a generation confronting limited paths to traditional success. (Goethe-Institut)
3. Marriage, fertility, and social reproduction
Economic insecurity affects family formation: younger adults delay marriage and parenthood when they can’t afford housing or feel financially unstable. That trend feeds back into demographic decline and labor supply issues, with long-run social and fiscal consequences.
Institutional barriers and geographic inequality
1. Hukou and mobility frictions
China’s household registration (hukou) still disciplines access to public services, affordable housing allocations, and local benefits. Migrant workers and many young adults who study in big cities lack local hukou, making it harder to secure the social goods that make urban life sustainable. Barriers to mobility and public benefits magnify the financial stress of city living for those without local ties.
2. Regional divergence in opportunities
Economic dynamism is geographically uneven. Coastal megacities and major hubs offer more high-paying jobs but also far higher living costs and competition. Smaller cities may be cheaper but offer weaker upward mobility. For many post-90s, choosing where to live is a painful tradeoff between opportunity and affordability.
Psychological and social costs: beyond numbers
The hardships of the post-90s generation are not only financial. They manifest as:
- Mental-health stress: pressure to conform to social expectations while lacking the material base creates anxiety and depressive symptoms for many young adults.
- Social resentment: visible inequality and stories of parental subsidies breed cynicism, social fracturing, and political sensitivity.
- Life-course delays: delayed family formation, home purchase, and longer periods of dependence reshape social institutions (housing markets, elder care, education).
These human costs compound economic insecurity and can undermine social cohesion if left unaddressed.
Why the near future may be tougher
Several structural trends suggest the headwinds may persist:
- Property sector retrenchment: After a credit squeeze and developer defaults, housing supply and buyer confidence are both affected; recovery is possible but could be slow, keeping housing unaffordability and delayed transactions in play. (Reuters)
- Slower growth and job creation: If GDP growth stays modest versus the double-digit era, new high-quality jobs will grow slowly, increasing pressure on young entrants. (TIME)
- Demographic shifts: An aging population will shift public resources and labor-market dynamics, with fewer young workers to support pensions and intergenerational transfers.
- Global uncertainty: Trade tensions, investment volatility, and supply-chain realignments can dampen enterprise investment and reduce startup dynamism — both sources of young people’s opportunities.
Taken together, these trends mean that without active policy or structural change, the post-90s cohort could see slower improvements in living standards than prior generations.
What can be done — policies, institutions, and personal strategies
Policy levers (what governments can do)
- Stabilize and reform housing markets: accelerate supply of affordable rental housing, repair trust in delivery for pre-sold homes, and make mortgage access fairer for first-time buyers. Public or state-led purchases of unsold homes and targeted affordable housing programs can ease the transition. (Financial Times, Reuters)
- Labor-market interventions: incentives for firms to hire graduates (subsidies, apprenticeships), stronger protections for gig and contract workers, and active labor programs to retrain workers for high-growth industries.
- Hukou reform and mobility: expand portability of social benefits and make urban public services more accessible to migrants to reduce the effective cost of moving for work.
- Support for entrepreneurship: de-risk early-stage startups with credit guarantees, R&D tax breaks, and incubator support to revive job-creating new firms.
- Mental-health and family support: scale counseling services and rethink family-friendly policies (childcare, parental leave) to reduce the lifecycle costs that inhibit marriage and fertility.
Employer practices (what firms can do)
- Offer secure entry-level contracts and clearer career ladders.
- Recognize parental dependence realities in mortgage-sensitive hiring decisions (e.g., proof of income for loan approvals).
- Invest in training and internal mobility to convert hires into long-term staff.
Personal strategies (what individuals can do)
- Financial realism: build emergency savings, avoid overleveraging for speculative asset plays, and consider renting strategically while saving.
- Skill diversification: invest in in-demand technical and soft skills that increase employability across sectors.
- Geographic tradeoffs: weigh the costs and benefits of moving to lower-cost cities with growing industries versus competing in megacities.
- Communal networks: cooperative housing, pooling resources, and mutual aid can blunt the worst immediate shocks.
A cautious prognosis
The post-90s generation faces the combined weight of structural economic shifts, a volatile property market, labor-market mismatch, and cultural expectations anchored to an asset-centric model of mobility. The result is a widespread sense of insecurity that is partly real (measurable joblessness, housing stress) and partly perceptual (comparisons with parents’ trajectories and social media displays). Without decisive policy moves — and private sector adjustments — the coming years could see slower increases in living standards and delayed household formation for large swaths of this cohort.
But there is room for policy and social innovation. Affordable rental markets, stronger rights for nonstandard workers, targeted hiring incentives, and a culture that values diverse life paths over one asset-heavy script can alter trajectories. The economy will not be remade overnight, but a combination of structural reforms and pragmatic private responses can prevent long-term scarring.
Closing: a generational test of social compact
The economic fate of the post-90s generation is not just about income or housing; it is a test of whether institutions can adapt to shifting realities. A society that expects each cohort to do better than the last must provide realistic pathways: decent jobs, affordable housing options, and social systems that recognize changing family and career patterns.
If China — and other countries facing similar youth-asset tensions — want to avoid a permanent drift toward delayed family formation, lower consumption, and political disaffection, they must act in ways that restore opportunity, reduce the asset barrier to social mobility, and acknowledge the real anxieties of a generation that did everything “right” only to find the ladder missing rungs.
Sources for key facts
- Youth unemployment and urban jobless rate trends (16–24 age group). (Reuters)
- Reporting and human impact from China’s property crisis and stalled developments. (Financial Times, Reuters)
- Analysis of China’s macroeconomic slowdown and high debt exposure. (TIME)
- Cultural shifts including the “lying flat” phenomenon and post-90s generational attitudes. (Goethe-Institut)
If you’d like, I can:
- Expand this into a long-form, referenced policy brief with data tables and city-level housing comparisons;
- Draft a short guide aimed at post-90s readers with concrete budgeting and job-search tactics tailored to China’s current market; or
- Produce a slide deck summarizing the problem and 8 policy actions for local governments.
Which would be most helpful?
